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ANDREW VEYSEY, 
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vs. 
ALEXIS VEYSEY, 
Respondent/ Appellant. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20150609 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Divorce Decree entered between the parties in 1999, and still in effect today, 
clearly orders Appellee Andrew Veysey ("Veysey") to pay one-half of all reasonable 
monthly day care expenses incurred on behalf of the parties' minor children. Despite 
actual knowledge of this order and of the fact that his children were incurring day care 
expenses from 2002 - 2006, Veysey refused to pay what was owed. Appellant Alexis 
Nelson ("Nelson") covered the expenses, taking Veysey at his word that he would get 
caught up when he could. 
Now, in an apparent attempt to detract from his own failure to comply with a court 
order, Veysey insinuates that Nelson's persistence in trying to enforce the order shows 
frivolity. To the contrary, the present appeal is firmly rooted in Utah law, having been 
necessitated first by Veysey's failure to comply with the 1999 court order, and also by 
instances of misapplication of Utah law by the lower court. "[I]t is hard to see why a 
parent should be relieved of any of the burdens of child-rearing costs by virtue of not 
having contributed to them in a timely manner." State of Utah v. Irizarry, 910 P.2d 425, 
(Utah 1997)(Durham, C., dissenting)( caselaw not relevant since decided prior to 
~ enactment of Utah Child Support Act). 
I. LAW OF THE CASE DOES NOT APPLY. 
A. VEYSEY I HELD THAT THERE WERE NO FINDINGS TO SUPPORT 
A DETERMINATION THAT LACHES APPLIED IN THIS CASE, AND THAT 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S PREVIOUS DETERMINATION THAT LACHES 
APPLIED WAS ERRONEOUS. 
"Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this court on appeal bind 
vJ the trial court on remand, and generally bind this court should the case return after 
remand." Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT 75 at ,r 9, 31 P.3d 543 
(Utah 2001). However, "(a]s confessed dicta, [a] musing on the potential outcome of a 
hypothetical situation is not binding upon this court." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,r 
28, 154 P.3d 808, 815 (Utah 2007). 
Here, the Court of Appeals proceedings did not result in a final judgment on the 
merits with respect to the issue of laches. Rather, the Court held that the 
"commissioner's recommendation contains no findings supporting a determination that 
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laches applies in this case ... Without specific findings supporting a determination that 
lac hes applied in this case, the commissioner's recommendation - and, accordingly, the 
district court's adoption of that recommendation - was erroneous." Veysey v. Veysey, 
2014 UT App 264, ,I 17 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). 
The Court further conjectured that "[i]f supported by adequate findings, a 
determination that some portion of Mother's claims are barred by }aches would not 
necessarily be inappropriate." Id. at ,r 18. This situation, however, was just one of four 
different scenarios that the Court hypothesized. Indeed, the Court also opined that "the 
district court may conclude that all of Mother's claims are reimbursable because they 
were brought within the statute of limitations." Id. In any case, the Court was careful to 
note that each of these hypothetical situations was purely speculative, and that "additional 
findings [were] needed to support the district court's determination." Id. 
This portion of the Court's opinion constitutes an expression that "[goes] beyond 
the facts before [the] court and therefore [encompasses] individual views of [the] author 
of [the] opinion," which, by definition, is non-binding "obiter dictum." Black's Law 
Dictionary, p. 454. This is precisely the type of "musing on the potential outcome of a 
hypothetical situation" that the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held does not invoke 
the law of the case doctrine. See Jones, 154 P.3d at 815. 
The question of whether Utah law precludes }aches as a defense to an action to 
enforce a child support order brought within the applicable statute of limitations has 
never been presented to nor considered by this Court. Accordingly, the law of the case 
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doctrine does not apply and this Court's consideration of the issue is needed to resolve 
..:J the matter. 
B. IF THE COURT IN VEYSEY I HAD HELD THAT LACHES APPLIED, 
THAT HOLDING WOULD BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND WOULD WORK 
A MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO NELSON AND HER CHILDREN, THEREBY 
PRECLUDING ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE. 
The law of the case doctrine "is not applied inflexibly. Indeed, this court need not 
apply the doctrine to promote efficiency at the expense of the greater interest in 
preventing unjust results or unwise precedent. Accordingly, the doctrine will generally 
not be enforced ... when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of 
Utah, 2001 UT 75 at ,I 9, 31 P.3d 543 (Utah 2001). 
As set forth below, under Utah law, !aches cannot be applied as a defense to court-
"" ordered child support. It was clear error for this Court to suggest otherwise, and would 
work a manifest injustice to Nelson if erroneously applied to deprive her of thousands of 
dollars expended to cover the portion of daycare expenses that Veysey had been court-
ordered to pay. Moreover, application of laches to the present case would work a 
manifest injustice to the children as well as to Nelson. Indeed, "it is hard to see why a 
parent should be relieved of any of the burdens of child-rearing costs by virtue of not 
having contributed to them in a timely manner. It is simply unrealistic to suggest ... that 
the money in question ... is now the custodial parent's money, not the children's. The 
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children's household is their custodial parent's household; her lifestyle is their lifestyle, 
and her gains and losses are theirs." State of Utah v. Irizarry, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 
l 997)(Durham, C., dissenting)( caselaw not relevant since decided prior to enactment of 
Utah Child Support Act). 
Therefore, even if the Court in Veysey I had held that laches applied, the law of the 
case doctrine should not be enforced since that holding would have been clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice to Nelson and her children. 
II. LACHESIS AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE ONLY APPLICABLE TO CASES 
SEEKING EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
"[I]t is the practically invariable rule that laches cannot be a defense before the 
statutory limitation has expired." Insight Assets v. Farias, 321 P.3d 1021, 1025-26 (Utah 
2013)(quoting F.MA. Fin. Corp. v. Build Inc., 404 P.2d 670,672 (1965)). Recently, the 
Utah Supreme Court has clarified the circumstances under which the laches defense may 
be invoked. Particularly, the "doctrine of laches is an equitable defense which arises in 
cases where the plaintiff seeks equitable relief ... However, where the plaintiff's claims 
are based in the law, the statute of limitations, not the doctrine of laches, governs the 
timing surrounding a plaintiff's filing of a complaint." DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & 
Co., 926 P.2d 835, 845 (Utah 1996)(citing American Tierra v. City of West Jordan, 840 
P.2d 757, 763 (Utah 1992)). Based on this analysis, the Court in DO/Theld that "[i]n the 
present case, because plaintiffs' claims against C & Lare based in the law, the trial 
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court's supplemental dismissal of these claims on the basis of the equitable doctrine of 
" laches was incorrect." Id. 
Veysey correctly notes that that the Court in DOITconsidered the earlier case of 
Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). In DOIT, however, the Court carefully 
construed Borland's holding as: "A defendant may successfully assert this defense [of 
laches] when a plaintiff seeking equity unreasonably delays in bringing an action and this 
delay prejudices the defendant." DOIT, Inc., 926 P .2d at 845 (Utah 1996) ( citing Borland 
v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987)(emphasis added)). 
Likewise, the subsequent 2013 Utah Supreme Court decision in Insight Assets 
noted a singular exception to the rule that "laches cannot be a defense before the statutory 
limitation has expired." Particularly, "the doctrine of laches may apply in equity, whether 
or not a statute of limitations also applies[.]" Insight Assets, 321 P.3d at 1025-26. Based 
on this analysis, the Insight Assets Court held that "[b ]oth the Purchase Money Rule and 
\JJ mortgage foreclosure actions are equitable in nature and therefore subject to the 
equitable defense of !aches[.]" Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, Veysey' s arguments are wrongheaded because they fail to distinguish 
between equitable actions for setting child support or establishing paternity in the first 
instance, and legal actions for enforcing child support already established by court order. 
This is an important distinction in this case, since the equitable defense of laches is 
prohibited as applied to legal actions for enforcing child support already established by 
court order. See Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 321 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Utah 2013)("The 
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doctrine of !aches may apply in equity[.]"); see also DOJT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 
926 P.2d 835, 845 (Utah 1996)(("The doctrine oflaches is an equitable defense which 
arises in cases where the plaintiff seeks equitable relief ... [W]here the plaintiffs claims 
are based in the law, the statute of limitations, not the doctrine of laches, governs the 
timing surrounding a plaintiffs filing of a complaint."( citing American Tierra v. City of 
West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 763 (Utah 1992)). 
While initially setting child support or establishing paternity requires a balancing 
of the equities (as was the case in the paternity action of Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1987)), enforcing an existing child support order is a purely legal exercise. 
Veysey has specifically conceded this point. (R. 992, ,r 5). This premise is also highly 
consistent with the decision in Veysey I, where this court recognized that child support is 
"the money legally owed by one parent to the other for the expenses incurred for children 
of the marriage[,]" and held that "variable daycare expenses constitute child support." 
Veysey, 2014 UT App 264 at ,r,r 14-15 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 274 (9th ed. 
2009),· see also Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199,201 (Wyo. 2000){"Laches does not 
apply to child support collection actions because suits for monetary judgments for child 
support arrearages are legal rather than equitable."). 
Because of the purely legal nature of enforcing existing child support orders, 
"[ e ]ach payment or installment of child ... support under any support order ... is, on and 
after the date it is due: (a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment 
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of a district court ... [ and] ( c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any 
jurisdiction[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-112(3)(a). 
All of Nelson's claims seek to enforce the existing child support order established 
in 1999. Accordingly, Nelson's "claims are based in the law [such that] the statute of 
limitations, not the doctrine of laches, governs the timing surrounding [the] filing of a 
complaint." DOIT, Inc., 926 P.2d at 845. Nelson's complaint was filed well within the 
~ established statute of limitations, which does not expire for another six years. (R. 714 ). 
It was thus clear error for this Court to opine that "(i] f supported by adequate findings, a 
determination that some portion of Mother's claims are barred by !aches would not 
necessarily be inappropriate." Veysey, 2014 UT App 264 at if 18. 
To the contrary, under Utah law, laches cannot be applied as a defense to court-
ordered child support. If this Court were to hold otherwise, it would work a manifest 
injustice to Nelson and her children by unfairly depriving them of thousands of dollars 
expended to cover that portion of daycare expenses that Veysey was court-ordered to pay. 
III. THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT CODIFIED AS UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 78B-12-214(3) IS NOT APPLICABLE, AND DOES NOT STATUTORILY 
AUTHORIZE A LACHES DEFENSE TO COURT-ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT. 
In this case, the district court expressly found that "Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12-214 
vP [is] not dispositive of this case." (R. 966, if 6) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Veysey's 
arguments with respect to the same are misplaced. 
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Veysey also incorrectly asserts that the notification requirement codified as Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78B-12-214(3) ("Section 214(3)") statutorily authorizes a !aches defense to 
court-ordered child support. This is simply not true. Rather, Section 214(3) provides a 
very narrow statutory exception to Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12-214(2)(a) ("Section 
214(2)(a)"), which states that "[i]f an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent 
shall begin paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof 
of the child care expense." 
The exception of Section 214(3) hinges exclusively on Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12-
214(2)(b) ("Section 2 l 4(2)(b )"), which provides that "[i]n the absence of a court order to 
the contrary, a parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide written verification of 
the cost and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement 
of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other parent." Section 214(3) does not 
contemplate a laches defense to a claim for court-ordered child support. Instead, it 
provides an extremely narrow opportunity for a court to statutorily deny a parent "the 
right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the 
expenses if the parent incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection 2(b)." Utah 
ode Ann.§ 78B-12-214(3). 
Importantly, however, Nelson's claims have not been denied under Section 
214(3). Indeed, the "Court found [that] Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12-214 [is] not 
dispositive of this case." (R. 966, ,r 6)(emphasis added). The sole reason the district 
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court even mentioned this Section was to support its equitable laches analysis, 
specifically "with respect to the reasonableness of [Nelson's] actions." (R. 966, 16). 
Veysey goes to great lengths to analogize SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. 
First Quality Baby Prod. LLC, a Federal Circuit patent case, to the present case. 
Contrary to Veysey's analysis, however, the SCA Hygiene case is simply not analogous 
~ here. 
JJ 
There, the court held that because "Congress codified a }aches defense in 3 5 
U.S.C. § 282(b )(I) that may bar legal remedies ... [the court had] no judicial authority to 
question the law's propriety." SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby 
Prod. LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(en bane). Here, on the other hand, 
Section 214(3) absolutely does not authorize a laches defense, or any other equitable 
defense, to court-ordered child support. In fact, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12-109 ("Section 
109") of the Utah Child Support Act specifically prohibits waiver and estoppel, also 
equitable defenses, when there is an "order already established by a tribunal." The 
existence of this Section 109 thus strongly suggests that the intent of the legislature was 
actually to prohibit application of equitable defenses to court-ordered child support. 
Notably, none of the cases from "sister states" in Veysey's string cite of footnote 7 
:J is relevant here, as none originates from our Tenth Circuit, and Veysey has failed to 
discuss how Florida, Ohio, Nevada, or New York law is even comparable to Utah law. 
See Brief of Appellee, p. 25, fn. 7. 
IO 
All of Nelson's claims are thus reimbursable under the Utah Child Support Act, 
since Section 214(3) does not apply, and no provision thereof statutorily authorizes 
!aches as a defense to court-ordered child support. 
IV. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY BOTH 
ELEMENTS OF A LACHES DEFENSE. 
"[T]he question of laches presents a mixed question of law and fact." Johnson v. 
Johnson, 2014 UT 21, ,r 8, 330 P.3d 704 (Utah 2014). "Pure questions oflaw ... are 
reviewed for correctness." Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, ,r 6, citing Huish v. 
Munro, 2008 Ut. Ct. App. 283, ,r 19, 191 P. 3d 1242 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). "[T]he 
determination of whether a party was prejudiced for purposes of the doctrine of laches is 
a legal conclusion that we review for correctness." Anderson v. Doms, 984 P.2d 392, 396 
(Utah Ct. App. 2003). However, "we will not set aside a trial court's findings of fact 
underlying that conclusion [ of prejudice] unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. 
Here, no finding of fact is in dispute with respect to the laches element of 
reasonableness. The findings of fact are only indirectly disputed with respect to the 
laches element of prejudice, since several findings conflict with each other based on an 
arbitrary cutoff date. Veysey thus misstates the standard of review for this issue. See 
Brief of Appellee, p. 25. In fact, Nelson contends only that the findings of fact do not 
support the district court's legal conclusion that both elements of laches were satisfied. 
This is purely a legal issue requiring de novo review. 
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Specifically, no finding of fact supports the legal conclusion that Nelson acted 
unreasonably in deciding to file her complaint when she did. The district court found that 
Nelson "believed the statute of limitations had not yet run." (R. 966, ,r 5). The district 
court also found that "all of [Nelson's] claims for reimbursement fall within the 
applicable statute of limitations." (R. 966, ,r 2). All remaining findings of fact regarding 
the element of reasonableness are irrelevant, since reliance on a statute of limitations is 
vjJ per se reasonable in a case of court-ordered child support, as set forth in Nelson's Brief of 
Appellant, p. 19-20. (R. 966, ,r,r 5-12). Nelson thus submits that the district court's 
conclusion that Nelson's conduct was unreasonable is incorrect and should be reversed. 
Similarly, no finding of fact supports the legal conclusion that Veysey was 
prejudiced with respect to expenses incurred prior to April, 2005, but not prejudiced with 
respect to expenses incurred after that date. Under Utah law, "[!]aches is not mere delay, 
but delay that works a disadvantage to another." Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). The only finding of fact 
made to support this cutoff date is that "[Veysey] does not strenuously object to those 
costs." (R. 966, ,r 16). While this finding of fact is not disputed, it is legally insufficient 
to support a cutoff date that is identical to that initially provided by the Commissioner, 
which was later determined to be based on an erroneous statute of limitations. 
~ Moreover, the findings of fact with respect to the district court's finding of 
prejudice are in conflict with each other. Specifically, the findings of fact made to 
support the finding of prejudice prior to April, 2005 (R. 966, ,r,r 13-15) do not comport 
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with the finding of fact made to support the finding of no prejudice after April, 2005 (R. 
966, ~ 18). As argued in detail in Nelson's Brief of Appellant, the findings of fact 
regarding prejudice hinge primarily on whether Nelson's calculations were reasonably 
accurate. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 21-24. Since the findings are based on identical 
evidence but are nevertheless blatantly disparate in this regard, they are legally 
insufficient to support a finding of prejudice, even prior to the April, 2005 cutoff date. 
Nelson thus submits that the findings of fact, while largely undisputed, do not 
support the legal conclusion that both elements of laches have been satisfied, as required 
by Utah law . Accordingly, the district court's decision should be reversed and Nelson 
should be awarded judgment on all claims, plus interest. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's decision in 
its entirety, and hold that all of Nelson's claims for child care expense arrearages from 
2002-2006 are reimbursable, plus interest. 
SIGNED and DATED this lirt:'1 day of _,,.A--l-i12"'-"ru_1 ....,_/ ___ , 2016. 
Pro Se 
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